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KIERAN HEALY† AND KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC†† 
ABSTRACT 
  In this Essay, we examine a case in which the organizational and 
logistical demands of a novel form of organ exchange (the 
nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor (NEAD) chain) do not 
map cleanly onto standard cultural schemas for either market or gift 
exchange, resulting in sociological ambiguity and legal uncertainty. In 
some ways, a NEAD chain resembles a form of generalized exchange, 
an ancient and widespread instance of the norm of reciprocity that 
can be thought of simply as the obligation to “pay it forward” rather 
than the obligation to reciprocate directly with the original giver. At 
the same time, a NEAD chain resembles a string of promises and 
commitments to deliver something in exchange for some valuable 
consideration—that is, a series of contracts. 
  Neither of these salient “social imaginaries” of exchange—gift 
giving or formal contract—perfectly meets the practical demands of 
the NEAD system. As a result, neither contract nor generalized 
exchange drives the practice of NEAD chains. Rather, the majority of 
actual exchanges still resemble a simpler form of exchange: direct, 
simultaneous exchange between parties with no time delay or 
opportunity to back out. If NEAD chains are to reach their full 
promise for large-scale, nonsimultaneous organ transfer, legal 
uncertainties and sociological ambiguities must be finessed, both in 
the practices of the coordinating agencies and in the minds of NEAD-
chain participants. This might happen either through the further 
elaboration of gift-like language and practices, or through a creative 
use of the cultural form and motivational vocabulary, but not 
necessarily the legal and institutional machinery, of contract. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A series of related contrasts dominate public debate and 
academic research about organ donation. At the level of individuals, 
donors motivated by altruism contrast with suppliers motivated by 
self-interest. At the level of institutions, systems organized through 
gift exchange contrast with the prospect of a system organized as a 
market. And at the level of interactions, the relational qualities of 
giving contrast with the thin connection created through spot 
transactions. Underlying each of these contrasts is a deeper division 
between two modes of exchange: a customary type rooted in 
reciprocity and a formal type built on contract. When bundled 
together, this series of contrasts often becomes a broad critique of 
markets. The self-interested, price-driven, instrumental orientation 
associated with formalized, contractual kinds of social organization 
therefore contrasts unfavorably with the virtues of expressivity, 
warmth, and social solidarity that are taken to flow from exchange 
built on altruism and sharing.1 
The norm of reciprocity—the obligation to give in return when 
one has been given something—has long been seen as amongst the 
oldest, most widespread, and most deep-seated of all human customs.2 
The fact that the norm of reciprocity is indeed a norm, however—a 
 
 1. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS 122–25 (2012) (discussing the commercialization of blood collection in the United 
States and noting that “the market values that suffuse the system exert a corrosive effect on the 
norm of giving”).  
 2. E.g., PETER P. EKEH, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY 47–48 (1974); Alvin W. Gouldner, 
The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 171, 174 (1960). 
HEALY & KRAWIEC IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2012  4:11 PM 
2012]    CUSTOM, CONTRACT, & KIDNEY EXCHANGE 647 
prescription or expectation about how to act, rather than a 
description of the way things are—leaves room for slippage between a 
prescribed form of social organization and its operation in practice. 
Actual systems of exchange are often very complex. Although norms 
may set forth general rules about the motives of participants and the 
structure of their social relations, in practice the system’s self-image 
may be decoupled from what really happens.3 This slippage is 
common enough even in relatively simple systems of exchange. It is to 
be expected in a complex case like the exchange of human organs. 
Getting a kidney safely out of one body and into another is not a 
straightforward task. Each stage of the process is organizationally and 
logistically difficult. Although organ donation is by now a familiar 
practice, making these nominally straightforward exchanges happen 
at all—regardless of whether they are publicly coded as gifts or as 
sales—is a complicated business. 
In this Essay, we examine how the organizational and logistical 
demands of a novel form of organ exchange create sociological 
ambiguity and legal uncertainty because those demands do not map 
cleanly onto the standard cultural schemas for either markets or 
donation. In a nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor (NEAD) 
chain, an altruistic donor freely gives a kidney to a patient, initiating a 
chain of transplants among a series of donor-patient pairs. Each 
donor has a kidney that is incompatible with “her” patient, so instead 
each donates her kidney to the compatible patient of another donor-
patient pair, forming the next link in the chain. NEAD chains are a 
relatively recent innovation in the transplant system, and they seem 
set to become more common in the future.  
What sort of exchange is this? In some ways, a NEAD chain 
resembles a form of generalized exchange, an ancient and widespread 
instance of the norm of reciprocity that can be thought of simply as 
the obligation to “pay it forward” rather than the obligation to 
reciprocate directly with the giver. Generalized exchange has long 
been seen as an extremely effective customary means of generating 
commitment and solidarity in social groups, because everyone 
participates in the exchange of values, rather than in a system of 
 
 3. Hence the classic structuralist treatment of social exchange, modeling a grammar of 
norms of exchange with little expectation that actual exchanges would smoothly conform to the 
model’s elegant ideal structure. See generally CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY 
STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (Rodney Needham, ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von 
Sturmer trans., Beacon Press rev. ed. 1969) (1949). 
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directly reciprocated dyadic transfers.4 This imagery of solidarity and 
collective commitment generated through a chain of gifts has been 
important to the success of NEAD chains. The most notable 
similarity between NEAD chains and true generalized exchange is 
the presence of a gap in time between exchanges, which introduces 
some standard elements of gift giving, especially the social obligation 
to reciprocate (pay forward) and the problem of trust that arises 
along with it. But these chains are an odd kind of generalized 
exchange. They do not cycle back on themselves as classical 
generalized exchange systems do; they occur between sets of pairs 
rather than between individuals; and, most importantly, they are to a 
large degree organizationally manufactured rather than locally 
emergent. 
Looked at from a different point of view, though, a NEAD chain 
is not like gift exchange at all. Instead, it resembles a string of 
promises and commitments to deliver something in exchange for 
some valuable consideration—in short, a series of contracts. After the 
first free donation, each donor-patient dyad in the chain in effect 
promises to pay the donor’s incompatible kidney forward upon 
receipt of a compatible kidney for the patient. But again, the fit is not 
perfect. These chains are an odd kind of contract. For one thing, of 
course, contracting for the sale of human organs is illegal, and 
NEAD-chain professionals explicitly disavow any role of formal 
contract. At the same time, it does seem as though each NEAD-chain 
pair offers something of value (a healthy, but incompatible, kidney) 
explicitly in exchange for something else of value (a healthy, 
compatible kidney) by mutual agreement at each point in the chain. 
Isn’t this the essence of contract? 
This Essay argues that, although both generalized exchange and 
formal contract can be thought of as culturally available schemas for 
governing the exchange of kidneys in NEAD chains, both are 
 
 4. Toshio Yamagishi & Karen S. Cook, Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas, 56 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 235, 237 (1993); see also EKEH, supra note 2, at 48, 52, 56 (“[A]s compared to 
restricted exchange, generalized exchange engenders a high degree of social solidarity.”); 
BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC: AN ACCOUNT OF NATIVE 
ENTERPRISE AND ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES OF MELANESIAN NEW GUINEA 
(1922); Peter Bearman, Generalized Exchange, 102 AM. J. SOC. 1383, 1413 (1997) (“In chain 
generalized exchange . . . social solidarity is protected from subgroup cleavage and free riding, 
yielding a more secure form of social solidarity.”); Robb Willer et al., Structure, Identity, and 
Solidarity: A Comparative Field Study of Generalized and Direct Exchange, 57 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
119, 143 (2012).  
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imperfect fits for the intricate realities of NEAD-chain exchange. 
Following Charles Taylor, we call these “social imaginaries” of 
exchange to emphasize their somewhat idealized form and their 
potentially loose connection with actual social organization.5 
As a practical matter, professionals in the transplant community 
seek to recruit and motivate donors, generate moral commitment and 
practical compliance from participants, and connect compatible 
donor-patient pairs to one another to accomplish actual transplants. If 
participants understand what they are doing in terms of a kind of gift 
exchange, this mindset may (or may not) help get things done. 
Similarly, if the exchange is understood as a kind of market transfer 
or contractual obligation, this view may make the actual 
accomplishment of transplants easier or more difficult. NEAD chains 
are interesting because different social imaginaries of exchange 
predominate at different points in the system. For purposes of 
recruiting and motivating donors, the imagery of generalized 
exchange is prominent, and the language of contracts is anathema and 
perceived as corrosive to the moral commitment associated with the 
act of donation. When it comes to listing patients as candidates for 
transplant, however, contract imagery is not uncommon. For 
example, doctors often draw up “contracts” with their patients to 
motivate compliance with diet, drug, or treatment regimes required to 
qualify for transplant candidacy.6 
The public aspect of NEAD chains emphasizes the individual 
moral qualities of the donors and the interpersonal bonds generated 
by participation in the chain. Here again the imagery of formalized 
commitment is rejected in favor of solidaristic feeling. Institutionally, 
however, the logistical back end of the exchange requires a 
considerable degree of formalization of procedure, ranging from the 
elaboration of cost-accounting formulae to mutually agreed-upon 
record-sharing arrangements that seem to be designed to ensure a fair 
 
 5. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23 (Dilip Gaonkar et al. eds., 
2004) (“By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellectual 
schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am 
thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others . . . .”).  
 6. See, e.g., John D. Scandling, Kidney Transplant Candidate Evaluation, 18 SEMINARS 
DIALYSIS 487, 492 (2005) (discussing the use of pre-transplant dialysis contracts that spell out 
the dialysis prescription and specify that noncompliance will disqualify the patient from 
transplant candidacy). 
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and quantifiable balance of exchange in good-quality organs between 
organizations.7 
Although NEAD-chain professionals leverage the available 
social imaginaries of gift exchange and contract at different points of 
the transplant process, neither perfectly meets the practical demands 
of the NEAD system. The result, we argue, is that the actual 
operation of NEAD chains has, so far, tended to fall back onto 
relatively simple forms of simultaneous direct exchange. 
We suggest that if NEAD chains are to realize their full promise 
of true large-scale, non-simultaneous, extended exchange, these 
ambiguities will need to be finessed in practice by the coordinating 
agencies and the participants themselves. Exchange of awkward 
goods—for example adoptive children, gametes, human tissue, and so 
on—is often accompanied by a considerable amount of practical and 
symbolic work that signals the transaction’s social meaning and 
dictates the basic principles by which the exchange is governed.8 In 
many such cases, change comes with growth. Expanding exchange 
systems often formalize. In the case of NEAD chains, growth is likely 
to increase the probability that some participants will renege on their 
promise to donate. Formalization of the exchange relation through 
contract may seem like a solution to this problem. It is important to 
note, however, that it is also possible for contract to be introduced in 
a primarily symbolic manner decoupled from institutional 
enforcement. The social meaning of NEAD chains (as understood by 
participants) may in the future be expressed through either the 
further elaboration of gift-like language and practices, or through 
contract-like language and interactions. But any contractual 
formalization of NEAD chains need not be accompanied by a proper 
institutional shift to the legal and institutional machinery of enforced 
contracts. 
 
 7. See, e.g., D.A. Mast et al., Managing Finances of Shipping Living Donor Kidneys for 
Donor Exchanges, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1810, 1810 (2011) (“The financial 
sustainability of such programs depends, in part, on consistent billing mechanisms that capture 
appropriate costs . . . and minimize financial and regulatory barriers to recipients, donors and 
institutions.”).  
 8. See generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005) (discussing 
“how people and the law manage the mingling of what sometimes seem to be incompatible 
activities: the maintenance of intimate personal relations and the conduct of economic 
activity”). 
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I.  NEAD CHAINS 
The demand for kidneys for transplantation far outstrips supply. 
As of October 5, 2012, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network reported 94,005 candidates on the kidney transplant waiting 
list,9 many of whom will die due to lack of available donors. In 2008 
alone, 4,573 kidney patients died while waiting for an organ 
transplant.10 In an attempt to close this gap between supply and 
demand in the face of restrictions on compensation for organ 
donation, which limit the number of transplants from unrelated 
donors, the medical community has developed innovative exchange 
mechanisms that seek to overcome barriers to related-party exchange 
stemming from immune-system or blood-type incompatibility. 
Consider two patients in need of kidney transplants, each of 
whom has found a living donor (a spouse, perhaps, or another 
relative, or a friend). Within each patient-donor dyad, the donor’s 
kidney is incompatible with the patient’s immune system—yet it is 
suitable for the patient in the other pair. There are thus two donor-
patient pairs, each incompatible internally but compatible with their 
counterparts. The obvious solution is a straightforward, simultaneous 
swap of kidneys between the two dyads. With the right combination 
of compatibilities across dyads, simultaneous swaps of three or four 
or even more pairs are possible in principle. In swaps of this sort, 
parties to the exchange cannot back out in the middle of things—
either everything happens at once, or nothing does. Although multi-
way pairings are possible in principle, they are rare in practice 
because the logistical demands of organizing simultaneous swaps 
grow rapidly as the number of pairs increases. Each individual in the 
swap requires her own surgical theater and team, either to remove the 
donor kidney or to transplant it into a recipient. Doing all of this at 
once is very difficult. As a result, simultaneous kidney exchanges 
typically involve only a limited number of swaps.11 
A NEAD chain converts the simultaneous, cyclical exchange of 
kidneys amongst two or more donor pairs into a chain of donations 
 
 9. Current U.S. Waiting List Organized by Organ, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp? (choose the “Waiting List” category; select 
“Candidates” and “Overall by Organ” radio buttons) (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).  
 10. Nat’l Kidney Found., 25 Facts About Organ Donation and Transplantation, UNC 
KIDNEY CTR., http://www.unckidneycenter.org/25facts.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).   
 11. Itai Ashlagi et al., The Need for (Long) Chains in Kidney Exchange 2 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18202, 2012). 
HEALY & KRAWIEC IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2012  4:11 PM 
652 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:645 
and transplants. The process begins with a kidney from an altruistic 
donor, who gives a kidney without having a particular recipient in 
mind. With this “extra” kidney in the system, the transplants do not 
need to take place all at once. Instead, a patient can have her donor 
pay it forward later—say, when another suitable patient-donor pair is 
found. In the meantime, the donor in the last dyad affirms her 
commitment to give, and awaits her turn to donate.12 
It is important to note that, in practice, efficient matching across 
even moderately large pools of patient-donor pairs is a difficult 
problem to solve computationally.13 Important complications include 
the constraints placed on possible swaps by the rules of blood-group 
compatibility and the immunological sensitivity of the patient (that is, 
how difficult it is to find good matches net of blood-group 
compatibilities).14 There is an ongoing technical debate about whether 
very long chains are necessary to clear large pools of incompatible 
patient-donor pairs.15 The answer depends on how the situation is 
modeled, and in particular on how immunologically sensitized 
patients are assumed to be. In general, short chains (of three or fewer 
pairs) are sufficient if patients are not too sensitized. A large increase 
in the number of undirected donors would also help clear the pool 
quickly and reduce the average chain length, though such an increase 
is quite unlikely empirically.16 Conversely, patients who are hard to 
match due to compatibility issues will tend to benefit from chains of 
longer length.17 
 
 12. See Michael A. Rees et al., A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1096, 1096–98 (2009) (describing this process).  
 13. See David J. Abraham et al., Clearing Algorithms for Barter Exchange Markets: 
Enabling Nationwide Kidney Exchanges, 8 PROC. ACM CONF. ON ELECTRONIC COM. 295, 297 
(2007) (describing algorithms used in kidney exchange). 
 14. See Ashlagi et al., supra note 11, at 3 (“[H]ighly sensitized patients are those for whom 
finding a transplantable kidney will be difficult, even from a donor with the same blood type, 
because of tissue-type incompatibilities.”). 
 15. Compare, e.g., S.E. Gentry & D.L. Segev, The Honeymoon Phase and Studies of 
Nonsimultaneous Chains in Kidney Paired Donation, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2778, 2778 
(2011) (contending that, in mature registries, domino-paired donations “give[] an equal or 
greater number of transplants than NEAD”), with Ashlagi et al., supra note 11, at 3 (“[L]ong 
chains increase the number of transplants that can be achieved, by increasing the number of 
highly sensitized patients who can receive transplants.”).  
 16. John P. Dickerson et al., Optimizing Kidney Exchange with Transplant Chains: Theory 
and Reality, 11 PROC. INT’L CONF. ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYS. 711, 715–
16 (2012).  
 17. Ashlagi et al., supra note 11, at 3.  
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These recent analytical advances in the understanding of the 
dynamics of kidney swaps and chains are substantial. For this Essay’s 
purposes, though, it is worth noting that current models necessarily 
take for granted the pool of patient-donor pairs. That is, they start 
from a state in which the patients have already found an incompatible 
donor willing to give a kidney and, by assumption, do not examine the 
possibility that a participant in the chain might renege on the promise 
to donate once her coregistered patient has received a kidney. This 
approach is of course quite reasonable given the matching problem 
that this work is trying to model. In terms of the pragmatics of the 
system, however, NEAD chains introduce the real possibility of 
reneging as the chain develops, and this is of great interest from the 
perspective of both customary obligation and formal contract, as each 
relies on quite different mechanisms to control reneging on promises. 
II.  CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION AND GENERALIZED EXCHANGE 
The social imaginary of generalized exchange is explicitly about 
discharging an obligation by giving to another later, when needed. 
The idea of generalized exchange is useful here because of the way it 
cuts across perhaps more familiar distinctions between giving and 
selling. Some ideal-typical forms of exchange are shown schematically 
in Figure 1.18 Restricted and generalized exchanges are the two main 
kinds, each with two subtypes. Restricted exchanges always involve a 
transfer between dyads. The first subtype, direct (or negotiated) 
exchanges, can be thought of as simple barter. Items or values are 
swapped simultaneously to the mutual satisfaction of the transactors. 
The second subtype, reciprocal exchange, involves an exchange of 
values in a dyad that unfolds over time. This is typical of many kinds 
of gift exchange between friends, such as the informal back-and-forth 
of favors, meals, or birthday presents. The time element in 
conjunction with the expectation of reciprocity in the back-and-forth 
of exchange is one of the things that allows the dyad (for example, a 
friendship) to have a real social existence.19  
 
 18. For further discussion of the distinctions made here, see EKEH, supra note 2, at 52–56; 
Bearman, supra note 4, at 1388–92; and Nobuyuki Takahashi, The Emergence of Generalized 
Exchange, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1105, 1106–09 (2000). 
 19. The back-and-forth of gift exchange is often thought of as being at bottom a utilitarian 
calculation of credits and debits. This was the view of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. 
James Carrier, Gifts, Commodities, and Social Relations: A Maussian View of Exchange, 6 SOC. 
FORUM 119, 120 (1991) (“Malinowski put forward a model that portrayed exchange ‘as 
essentially dyadic transactions between self-interested individuals, and as premised on some 
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type of exchange individuals give, but person-to-person giving and 
reciprocation is not embedded in some larger pattern or structure. 
Individuals know there is an obligation to give and have an 
expectation that they will receive from others, but they do not have a 
rule about whom in particular to give to or get from.21 
In gift exchange generally, the time delay between the initial 
service and its reciprocation is crucial to making the exchange 
interpretable as a gift. As a rule—outside of specific festivals or 
rituals—a gift that is immediately reciprocated is not a gift at all.22 If 
done deliberately, immediate reciprocation is probably an insult. 
To reiterate, these patterns of gift exchange can be seen as ideal-
typical possibilities that actual systems of exchange approximate more 
or less closely. When social relations are complex and multilayered, as 
when there are many participants and kinds of actors, gift exchange is 
less about actual relations between concrete actors and more an 
orienting cultural logic that helps make sense of things. The version of 
gift exchange adopted and extended by the transplant community 
since the 1970s, the “gift of life,” emphasizes the personal 
satisfactions of giving and the social and moral obligations people 
ought to feel when it comes to participating.23 Its main benefit in the 
case of organ donation generally is its ability to frame and motivate 
the goodwill necessary to participate in a difficult exchange that often 
takes place in tragic circumstances. It is a testament to the power of 
this social imaginary of exchange that it remained plausible even as 
both the organizational underpinnings of organ procurement and the 
algorithms governing organ allocation became ever larger in scope 
and more difficult to understand in their fine detail. 
 
 21. See Takahashi, supra note 18, at 1113 (“In pure-generalized exchange, each actor gives 
resources to a recipient(s) that he chooses unilaterally.”).  
 22. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, PRACTICAL REASON: ON THE THEORY OF ACTION 94 
(Randall Johnson trans., Polity Press 1998) (1994) (“[I]n practically all societies, it is tacitly 
admitted that one does not immediately reciprocate for a gift received . . . .”); PIERRE 
BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 105 (Richard Nice trans., Polity Press 1990) (1980) (“[I]f 
it is not to constitute an insult, the counter-gift must be deferred and different, because the 
immediate return of an exactly identical object clearly amounts to a refusal.”). 
 23. See KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN 
BLOOD AND ORGANS 23–35 (2006) (describing the role of ideals of gift exchange in the creation 
of a socially legitimate transplant system in the 1970s and 1980s). 
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III.  NEAD CHAINS AS GENERALIZED EXCHANGE 
The NEAD chain also harnesses the logic of the gift, but in a 
slightly different way from the case of cadaveric donation. In 
particular, the power of generalized exchange to generate feelings of 
group solidarity and commitment—to keep chains going—is 
important to participants and coordinators. Although the logistics of 
multicenter, multiperson transplant chains are complex, the moral 
imperative to “pay it forward” is easy for patients and donors to 
grasp, and this concept allows transplant centers to draw on well-
established tropes associated with the “gift of life” to generate and 
maintain the trust required to see the chain through to its final link.24 
As in the case of cadaveric donation, however, the real 
organization of NEAD chains does not fit perfectly with the idealized 
model. Notwithstanding its power to create moral commitment and 
solidarity, the sense of obligation encouraged by the injunction to 
“pay it forward” has sometimes proven insufficient in circumstances 
in which people have time to consider, and reconsider, their voluntary 
commitment to pay forward in a trying and perhaps frightening 
surgery once their own recipient has received a kidney from someone 
else. 
Media coverage and debates within the transplant literature on 
the costs and benefits of simultaneity and long chains—not to 
mention several cases in which donors have actually reneged on their 
promises—all support the view that the risk of donor reneging is a 
real constraint on the generalized-exchange structure of NEAD 
chains. For example, commentators debate the benefits of 
nonsimultaneous transplants, weighing the flexibility afforded by 
nonsimultaneity against the risk of reneging donors.25 Others employ 
models to determine whether, given the heightened risk of donors 
reneging as chains become extended or the time between surgeries 
becomes longer, longer chains provide benefits that outweigh 
 
 24. See, e.g., Gift of Life’s First Multi-Site Paired Kidney Exchange, GIFT OF LIFE DONOR 
PROGRAM (June 24, 2011), http://www.donors1.org/about/media/press1/pairedkidney 
(describing a successful transplant chain which resulted in kidney transplants for five people); 
Living Donors, NAT’L KIDNEY REGISTRY, http://www.kidneyregistry.org/living_donors.php 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2012) (invoking the “gift of life” and also noting that “Good Samaritan 
donors participating in the Registry will be assured that: . . . [the national kidney registry] will 
work hard to create the longest chain which maximize[s] [a donor’s] gift by facilitating as many 
transplants as possible”). 
 25. S.E. Gentry et al., The Roles of Dominos and Nonsimultaneous Chains in Kidney 
Paired Donation, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1330, 1332, 1334–35 (2009).  
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reneging risks.26 A much-discussed New York Times article on NEAD 
chains repeatedly emphasized the trade-offs in longer chains of lives 
saved versus donor-reneging risk.27 Reneging is thus widely 
recognized as a serious issue by those within the transplant 
community, and this risk presumably shapes the structure, size, 
number, and type of participants, as well as other factors affecting the 
success of NEAD chains. 
Reneging is no mere hypothetical. There is no national database 
or comprehensive set of NEAD-chain statistics, nor are donor-
reneging rates known.28 The NEAD-chain literature, however, 
contains several accounts of bridge donors who failed to perform on 
their promise to pay a kidney forward. In one case, the bridge donor, 
the husband of a kidney recipient, was unable to be matched with a 
suitable recipient after his wife’s transplant. After one year of 
attempting a match, he withdrew from the chain. According to the 
published account, the donor would have lost his job by donating, 
causing the entire family to lose insurance coverage, including 
insurance for his recently transplanted wife.29 Whether this potential 
job loss and resulting insurance problem was due to a change in 
circumstance or was a known consideration at the outset of the wife’s 
transplant is not discussed, though the authors state that the husband 
withdrew “owing to changes in the economy.”30 
In a separate case of reneging in this same NEAD chain, the 
transplant center was unable to reach the donor several months after 
his or her coregistered recipient received a transplant, despite 
numerous attempts at contact. No further information is reported 
about either the donor or recipient, or their relationship to each 
other.31 Another reneging donor broke a chain at Johns Hopkins. The 
only detail reported is that there was “a long interval between the 
intended recipient’s transplant . . . and the request for the bridge 
donor to participate in the next transplant.”32 
 
 26. Dickerson et al., supra note 16, at 716. 
 27. Kevin Sack, 60 Lives, 30 Kidneys, All Linked, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at A1.  
 28. Dickerson et al., supra note 16, at 716 (“[N]o reliable quantification of a renege rate 
exists due to the infancy of kidney exchanges.”).  
 29. David B. Leeser et al., Living Donor Kidney Paired Donation Transplantation: 
Experience as a Founding Member Center of the National Kidney Registry, 26 CLINICAL 
TRANSPLANTATION E213, E217 (2012). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Gentry et al., supra note 25, at 1335. 
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These examples demonstrate both the strengths and possible 
limitations of the gift-exchange model for NEAD chains. NEAD 
chains currently operate under that model and, together with paired 
exchanges, accounted for 429 transplants in 2010.33 The bulk of those 
transplants, however, were simultaneous or nearly so. NEAD chains 
are still new and relatively untested on a large scale.34 At present the 
number of NEAD-chain transplants remains well below the two- to 
four-thousand per year that models estimate could eventually be 
achieved.35 
Reaching that goal will depend on a number of factors, including 
managing the risk that donors will renege. As previously discussed, 
the presence of an altruistic donor at the front end of the chain allows 
all other chain members to pay a kidney forward, thus removing the 
simultaneity constraint. This increased flexibility may allow more and 
better transplants, particularly among highly sensitized patients, but it 
carries with it the risk of donor reneging. This risk is considered 
tolerable because no individual in the chain is irreparably harmed—
no pair has lost a kidney prior to receiving one, and each thus always 
retains the “bargaining chip” of the donor’s kidney, enabling them to 
participate in future swaps and chains.36 But reneging risk, if 
sufficiently high, threatens the existence of NEAD chains. In a system 
based on trust, donor defections must be contained. 
IV.  OBLIGATION AND CONTRACT 
If the informal bonds of custom break down and the solidarity of 
generalized exchange is not sufficient to bind participants throughout 
the NEAD-chain process, then what about the alternative social 
imaginary of contractual exchange? Though the time delay between 
the initial service and its reciprocation is crucial to making an 
exchange interpretable as a gift, time delay also invites consideration 
of the machinery of contract. In fact, the very purpose of contract is to 
facilitate the exchange of goods or services over time, because 
simultaneous exchange is easily carried out without reliance on 
contract. Only when it is useful to exchange goods or services 
 
 33. Sack, supra note 27.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Rees et al., supra note 12, at 1098–99. 
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sequentially, such that a reliance on promises of future performance 
becomes necessary, does contract law become relevant.37 
Although the specter of contract haunts the NEAD process, 
formal contracts have not been employed to address the risk of 
reneging that arises from nonsimultaneous performance in NEAD 
chains. Patients sometimes seek clarification about whether they are 
required to sign a binding contract when they agree to join a chain, 
and are assured that no written obligation will be sought.38 NEAD-
chain transplant surgeons and administrators raise the possibility of 
having patients sign written contracts, only to dismiss the prospect as 
overly legalistic and detrimental to the trust and moral commitment 
that motivates NEAD-chain participation. As stated by one group of 
physicians and administrators when describing an early NEAD chain 
in which their respective hospitals participated: 
  The possibility of other donors backing out in a multicentered 
chain such as this one must be addressed. No one involved in this 
chain was required to sign a contract. Live organ donation is strictly 
voluntary; donors always retain the right to change their minds and 
must never feel coerced by signed contracts. We relied on donors’ 
honesty and good will to follow through as planned. We maintain 
that the basic principle of organ donation is based upon selfless 
generosity and faith in the human spirit, rather than contractual 
obligations. We would discourage future participants from becoming 
mired in legal arguments and lengthy debates that would only cause 
interminable delays.39 
Others simply assume that contracts are legally unenforceable in 
the NEAD-chain setting.40 Understanding the roots of this view 
 
 37. ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 19 (2011). 
 38. See, e.g., Living Donor Kidney Center, DEP’T OF SURGERY, WEIL CORNELL MED. 
COLL., http://www.cornellsurgery.org/patients/services/livingdonor/faq-kpd.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012) (including “Are There Donor Agreements?” in the frequently asked questions 
section of the website and informing prospective bridge donors that “[d]onors who choose to 
enter a [Kidney Paired Donation (KPD)] registry are not obligated to sign an agreement” but 
that they “are asked to make a firm decision to participate” because “[i]f a donor were to back-
out at the last minute, this would ‘break the chain’”). 
 39. F.K. Butt et al., Asynchronous, Out-of-Sequence, Transcontinental Chain Kidney 
Transplantation: A Novel Concept, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2180, 2183 (2009).  
 40. See, e.g., Dickerson et al., supra note 16, at 2 n.1 (“[I]t is illegal to contract for an organ 
in most countries.”); Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, Market Design for Kidney Exchange 2 
(Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www2.bc.edu/~sonmezt/kidney-
exchange-survey-2011-04-25.pdf (“Since kidney donations are gifts, . . . it is not legal to 
contractually bind a donor to make future donations.”).  
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requires a familiarity with the National Organ Transplant Act 
(NOTA),41 its legislative history, and the requirements of contract 
law. This analysis also nicely illustrates the NEAD chain’s uneasy 
position as neither fully gift nor fully contract, but rather as 
possessing elements of the imagery of each. 
NOTA forbids the knowing acquisition, receipt, or transfer of 
any human organ for “valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”42 
Superficially, NOTA’s mandate appears to stand in direct contrast to 
the common-law requirements of contract. To rise to the level of legal 
enforceability, contracts must be supported by legal consideration—
that is, a bargained-for exchange, such as a promise for a promise, or 
a promise for a performance.43 
The social imaginary of gift exchange adopted and extended by 
the transplant community to facilitate traditional organ donation 
maps nicely onto the legal distinction between gift and contract: a 
living donor who simply donates her kidney to an intended recipient, 
as under a traditional living-donor arrangement, receives only the 
satisfaction of helping another. The donation is a gift rather than an 
exchange. Therefore, NOTA’s prohibition against the exchange of 
“valuable consideration” is not implicated,44 nor is contract law’s 
requirement of valid consideration satisfied. In the case of traditional 
organ donation, the gift imagery thus fluidly tracks the legal regime, 
framing and motivating the goodwill necessary to participate in organ 
donation. 
The NEAD-chain community also harnesses the logic of gift to 
generate feelings of group solidarity and commitment.45 Yet, organ 
donations through NEAD chains or paired exchanges are not gifts in 
either the colloquial or legal senses of that term. When a bridge 
donor promises to transfer her kidney to a designated recipient in 
exchange for the organ-matching program’s promise to allocate a 
kidney to her loved one, both the bridge donor’s promise and that of 
the matching program are undertaken for the purpose of inducing the 
 
 41. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 274–274e (2006 & Supp IV. 
2011). 
 42. Id. § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). 
 43. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 41 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 44. NOTA § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). 
 45. For a discussion of reliance on the “gift of life” metaphor, see supra notes 23–24 and 
accompanying text. 
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other party’s promise. Such a bargained-for exchange satisfies the 
common-law contract requirement of consideration and, because the 
bridge donor receives a benefit in exchange for her kidney, which 
raises the question of whether “valuable consideration” has been 
received in violation of NOTA section 301. It was precisely the fear 
that such exchanges were not mere gifts that prompted congressional 
clarification, under the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation 
Act (Norwood Act),46 that NOTA’s prohibition against the exchange 
of valuable consideration for human organs does not extend to 
simultaneous kidney swaps (Kidney Paired Donation, or KPD).47 The 
Norwood Act, however, did not specifically address NEAD-chain 
donations, which were a new and rare method at that time. 
The existence of legal consideration in NEAD-chain bridge-
donor contracts, however, does not necessarily mean that such chains 
involve “valuable consideration” in violation of NOTA section 301. 
Neither the text of NOTA section 301, nor the provision’s legislative 
history, define the term “valuable consideration.” Both, however, 
provide insight into the term’s meaning by suggesting a congressional 
concern with the buying and selling of human organs for profit, rather 
than an attempt to prohibit all transactions in human organs that 
involve some element of exchange. 
Looking first at the language of the statute, the title chosen by 
Congress “can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.”48 
The title of NOTA section 301—“Prohibition of organ purchases”49—
suggests a congressional concern with organ purchases and sales for 
pecuniary gain. 
NOTA’s legislative history suggests a similar congressional 
concern with for-profit commerce in human organs. For example, the 
accompanying Senate report states that the bill “[p]rohibits the 
interstate buying and selling of human organs for transplantation” 
and “is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of kidneys and 
 
 46. Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act (Norwood Act), Pub. L. No. 110-144, 
121 Stat. 1813 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); ERIN D. 
WILLIAMS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33902, LIVING ORGAN DONATION AND 
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 4 (2010) (observing that the Norwood Act relieved concerns that 
paired donations violate NOTA).  
 47. See Norwood Act § 2, 121 Stat. at 1813 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 274e) (stating that the 
prohibition against transfer of organs for valuable consideration “does not apply with respect to 
human organ paired donation”). 
 48. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991). 
 49. NOTA § 301, 42 U.S.C. 274e. 
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other organs.”50 It further states that “[i]t is the sense of the 
Committee that individuals or organizations should not profit by the 
sale of human organs for transplantation,” and that “human body 
parts should not be viewed as commodities.”51 Similarly, the House 
conference report states that “[t]his Title intends to make the buying 
and selling of human organs unlawful.”52 These facts, among others, 
caused the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel to 
opine in March 2007, pursuant to a request by the general counsel of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, that the “term 
[valuable consideration] as used in section 301 does not apply to an 
LDDD [Living Donor/Deceased Donor] Exchange or a Paired 
Exchange, because neither involves the buying or selling of a kidney 
or otherwise commercializes the transfer of kidneys.”53 
This discussion is not to imply that NEAD chains’ place within 
contract law is unproblematic, or even to suggest that NEAD-chain 
organizers should rely on contract law to induce performance, even if 
they are legally entitled to do so. As will be seen, the contract 
imaginary, like the gift imaginary, also fails to fully capture the needs 
and realities of NEAD-chain organization. But this analysis shows 
that the requirements of contract law do not necessarily conflict with 
NOTA’s prohibitions. Legitimate arguments could be made on behalf 
of the contract model if NEAD-chain professionals chose to invoke 
them. 
But they have not. Instead, NEAD-chain professionals 
specifically reject the contract model. In particular, before the 
Norwood Act’s clarification of the legal status of paired exchange, a 
2006 United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) associate general 
counsel’s memorandum analyzed the applicability of NOTA section 
301 to KPD and list donation. The UNOS memorandum began by 
rejecting (consistent with our analysis) NOTA’s applicability to 
kidney swaps, stating: “‘[v]aluable consideration’ under NOTA § 301 
is a monetary transfer or a transfer of valuable property between 
donor, recipient and/or organ broker in a sale transaction. It is not 
familial, emotional, psychological or physical benefit to the organ 
 
 50. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2, 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978. 
 51. Id. at 16–17, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3982.  
 52. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 
3992.  
 53. Legality of Alt. Organ Donation Practices Under 42 U.S.C. § 274e, 31 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 
(2007).  
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donor or recipient . . . .”54 In its zeal to advocate for KPD and list-
donation exemptions from section 301, however, UNOS went further, 
erroneously concluding that such transactions were necessarily gifts, 
lacking any legal consideration: 
In fact, there is no “consideration” at all in a living organ donation 
arrangement because the donation is a “gift” . . . . 
  A gift is different from a contract. A contract does not involve 
donative intent. “Consideration” and the mutual agreement of the 
parties are required to make the contract legally binding. A gift, on 
the other hand, involves a gratuitous transfer by the donor and no 
transfer of money, property or services or agreement not to exercise 
rights or to suffer material detriment (“consideration”) by the 
beneficiary. For that reason, no “consideration” is present in a gift. 
A mere promise alone to make a gift of an organ is not intended to 
be legally binding.55 
As already noted, however, this analysis conflates the gift 
exchange of traditional living donors with the bargained-for exchange 
of paired exchanges and NEAD chains. As the discussion in this 
section has illustrated, the unavailability of contract in the NEAD-
chain setting is not a forgone conclusion. Thus, given two culturally 
available models for governing the exchange of kidneys in NEAD 
chains—gift and contract—NEAD-chain professionals have opted for 
the imaginary of gift, explicitly rejecting the imaginary of contract. 
V.  CHAINS AND CONTRACTS 
Just as NEAD chains imperfectly reflect the gift model, so too is 
contract an imperfect fit. This is perhaps most clear with respect to 
damages and enforcement. Specific performance is not available—
that is, no court would order that a person’s kidney be taken 
involuntarily—but monetary damages are the common alternative to 
judicially enforced performance. As a result, the experimental 
literature on “crowding out” is potentially relevant to the workability 
of contract in the NEAD-chain context in a number of ways. 
The theory behind crowding out is that extrinsic incentives can, 
under certain conditions, effect individual motivation and the framing 
 
 54. WILLIAMS MULLEN, POSITION STATEMENT: KIDNEY PAIRED 
DONATIONS, KIDNEY LIST DONATIONS AND NOTA § 301, at 3 (2006) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
 55. Id. at 2, 4 (footnotes omitted). 
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of social interactions.56 For example, people may donate, volunteer, or 
engage in other prosocial behavior because to do so makes them 
seem (or feel) like a good person—that is, it affects their image or 
self-image.57 The fear is that monetary incentives, by creating doubt as 
to whether such actions are motivated by the desire for financial gain 
rather than by a desire to help others, could displace these prosocial 
(or image-based) motivations.58 
Existing experimental studies, however, were not designed with 
NEAD-chain bridge donors in mind. NEAD-chain bridge donors 
initially agree to transfer a kidney to a stranger for the purpose of 
receiving a kidney that is a suitable match for their friend or family 
member—not for the purpose of contributing to the public good. 
Once the pair has received a kidney, how is the act of following 
through on the exchange, rather than reneging, perceived? Will it be 
seen as a donation, as the follow-through on a prior promise, or as 
something else? And how would the prospect of contract damages for 
reneging affect that image? Studies of the effect of monetary 
incentives on the decision to donate seem poorly suited to answer 
such questions.59 
More helpful are studies that specifically address decisions to 
defect or renege on a prior promise. Some studies suggest that the use 
 
 56. See generally Uri Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work To Modify 
Behavior, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2011) (reviewing the crowding-out literature). 
 57. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1652, 1652 (2006) (suggesting that motivation to perform prosocial behavior can be 
described by a utility function with three components: the value of extrinsic rewards, the level of 
enjoyment of an activity, and image—both self-image and the perceptions of others). 
 58. Id. 
 59. In any event, large-scale studies on the activity most closely related to organ 
donation—blood donation—suggest that monetary incentives do not crowd out prosocial 
behavior. See, e.g., Nicola Lacetera et al., Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Displacement 
Effects in Pro-Social Behavior, 4 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 186, 186 (2012) (presenting 
evidence from roughly fourteen thousand American Red Cross blood drives and concluding 
that “economic incentives have a positive effect on blood donations without increasing the 
fraction of donors who are ineligible to donate”); Lorenz Goette & Alois Stutzer, Blood 
Donations and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment 15–16 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, 
Discussion Paper No. 3580, 2008) (presenting evidence from a study of more than ten thousand 
previous blood donors and finding that offering lottery tickets in exchange for donated blood 
increases donations without negative selection effects). But see Carl Mellström & Magnus 
Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
845, 848–56 (2008) (presenting evidence of a drop in blood donations among women, but not 
men, when subjects were offered fifty Swedish kronor (roughly seven dollars) to donate blood, 
though donations returned to normal levels when subjects were given the option to donate the 
money to charity). 
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of monetary incentives or penalties may signal distrust, undermining 
compliance in trust-based relationships.60 The most relevant of these 
studies to the NEAD-chain experience are those analyzing how the 
enforceability of a contract affects individual performance. For 
example, Bohnet, Frey, and Huck find that intermediate levels of 
contract enforcement lead to a crowding out of performance, whereas 
high and low levels of enforceability lead to “crowding in.”61 This 
effect occurs because, under high levels of enforcement, performance 
is assured by the legal system. Under low levels of enforcement, 
performance is assured by the careful screening of counterparties by 
the contract participants themselves. The worst legal regime is one 
with intermediate enforcement levels, which leads to more dishonest 
participants in the system (relative to the low-enforcement regime) 
and insufficient external incentives to deter breach.62 
This research is consistent with current NEAD-chain experience. 
Either legal enforcement or participant screening, combined with 
norms of trust and reciprocity, can ensure performance. NEAD-chain 
participants have, to this point, relied on informal mechanisms to 
induce performance and have explicitly rejected the contract model. 
But, if formal contract is viewed as a possible replacement for or 
enhancement of the gift-based model, then attention must be paid to 
available contract remedies. This attention highlights the tensions 
between the needs of the NEAD system and the regime of contract 
law. 
Damages that are too low or enforcement that is too spotty may 
invite parties to interpret available contract damages as the de facto 
price for a kidney and so reduce performance, as suggested by 
Bohnet, Frey, and Huck’s research. Yet attempts to liquidate 
damages at high levels may raise concerns about coercion and about 
whether the amounts are punitive, as opposed to compensatory. 
An interesting question—one that we do not claim to answer—is 
whether a low-enforcement regime that employed nominal awards, 
such as a symbolic amount of one dollar, in recognition of the fact 
that a legal injury has been sustained, could enhance the existing 
informal gift-based model employed in NEAD chains, perhaps by 
leveraging shaming and broader social norms about reneging on 
 
 60. See Gneezy et al., supra note 56, at 199–201 (reviewing this literature). 
 61. Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001). 
 62. Id. 
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promises to the detriment of others. Symbolic damages of this type 
are sometimes sought and awarded, on the justification that 
normative statements regarding legal transgressions are important to 
both individual plaintiffs and society at large.63 Finally, perhaps the 
simple presence of a contract itself could perform some useful work 
in the context of NEAD chains, acting as a filter for reliable chain 
participants, screening out potential free riders, or serving as a 
pragmatic reminder of the seriousness and credible commitment of 
the participants.64 
At the same time, the insertion of formal contract into what is 
currently a purely trust-based system inevitably makes the market-
like aspects of NEAD-chain transactions more salient. The 
contracting process itself can be formal and legalistic, and could 
conceivably alter the decision-making frame, for better or for worse. 
And it does not require much imagination to conclude that the 
availability of monetary damages for the breach of a promise to 
donate an organ may look, to some observers, equivalent to a 
purchase price for kidneys. 
The crowding-out framework usefully elaborates the intuition 
that the introduction of incentives can cause people to switch their 
interpretation of an exchange, with unwanted results. There are two 
relevant parts to the insight. First, a price or other monetary incentive 
may change motives, as already discussed.65 Second, a fine or an 
award of money damages may act as a price. Hence, one might be 
tempted to argue that a contract in which money damages are 
potentially available could inadvertently encourage a deliberately 
strategic kind of participation, with the result being a rise in reneging. 
Although this scenario is a possibility, we should take care not to 
 
 63. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 215, 241–42 (2011) (arguing that private law influences behavior, not only through setting 
incentives, but also through setting norms, and invoking nominal and punitive damages as 
examples).  
 64. The intentional use of vague, unenforceable, or otherwise problematic contract terms, 
even when both contracting parties are sophisticated actors aware of the offending term, is well 
documented, though the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. See, e.g., 
Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 131, 136 (2012) (“[E]ven if the legal terms of a sovereign debt contract are not 
enforceable by courts, they can matter.”); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 65–66 (1963) (explaining why some 
businesses choose to use contracts even when they are not necessary to ensure compliance).  
 65. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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forget the structure of the actual exchange and the limits it places on 
routine bad faith of this kind. 
First, the underlying medical nature of the transaction persists 
regardless of whether the exchange is governed by gift or contract. A 
consequence of this is that, in practice, medical exemptions for 
nonparticipation are almost always available. In much the same way 
that courts would not force performance of a kidney contract, in 
practice doctors will not force patients to go through with a donation 
if they really do not want to—and, moreover, are likely to provide 
them with a medical reason to cover their nonparticipation.66 
Second, and more generally, the NEAD-chain community’s 
rejection of the contract model does not appear to be based on a 
careful weighing of the costs and benefits of contract, as compared to 
gift, which presents its own challenges and imperfections, as already 
discussed. Rather, the choice appears both simpler and more familiar. 
In his famous 1963 study of contracting practices among Wisconsin 
businesses, Stewart Macaulay concluded that business people 
frequently settled disputes without regard to existing contractual 
arrangements, which they considered a “legalistic” nuisance. Said one 
businessperson: 
[I]f something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone 
and deal with the problem. You don’t read legalistic contract clauses 
at each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn’t run 
to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave 
decently.67 
Though the settings are very different—in particular, NEAD-
chain bridge donors are not repeat transactors who need to protect 
their reputation for trustworthiness to generate future exchanges—
the sentiments are remarkably consistent with those expressed by 
some NEAD-chain professionals.68 
 
 66. The example of the donor who was allowed to withdraw due to “changes in the 
economy” demonstrates that even nonmedical rationales may be invoked to excuse from 
performance a sympathetic donor who has had a change of heart. See supra notes 29–30 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. Macaulay, supra note 64, at 61. 
 68. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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VI.  CUSTOM, CONTRACT, AND ORGANIZATIONS 
We have argued that neither of the salient social imaginaries of 
exchange—gift giving or formal contract—perfectly meets the 
practical demands of the NEAD system. The question, then, is 
whether the ambiguities can be finessed by the practices of NEAD-
chain professionals and in the minds of transplant participants. 
Exchange of awkward goods is often accompanied by a considerable 
amount of practical and symbolic work that signals the transaction’s 
social meaning and the basic principles by which it is governed. 
Rather than cleaving to one pure model of exchange or another, in 
such circumstances there is often a deliberate mixing of various 
modes, as when egg donation is strongly embedded in a rhetoric of 
selfless gift giving but also involves the transfer of substantial 
amounts of money.69 In many such cases, expansion often brings 
formalization. If NEAD chains follow that path, perhaps the 
professional resistance to potential contractual solutions will wane. 
Formalization has already occurred at some stages of the NEAD-
chain process, though so far it has taken place not on the donor-
patient side but at the organizational back end. As transplant centers, 
organ procurement organizations, hospitals, insurers, and other 
participating entities have come to collaborate on longer chains, 
organizational actors have begun to push for the development and 
elaboration of clearer procedures for sharing information, 
standardizing cost and reimbursement structures, and clarifying the 
expectations and obligations of the institutional participants in the 
chains.70 This elaboration has been in the form of procedural 
standardization rather than inter-organizational contracts as such. 
Thus far in practice, the social imaginary of generalized 
reciprocity frames the public side of NEAD chains. Contract lurks in 
the background, not so much as a means of enforcing shadow prices 
but more as a potential alternative for normatively generating 
commitment among participants. This is consistent with the 
organization of other types of awkward exchanges—adoptive 
children, gametes, and surrogacy, for example—and yet contrary to 
popular expectation, which often assumes that the growth of an 
exchange system straightforwardly entails the displacement of less 
 
 69. RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS 110–144 (2011).  
 70. See Mast et al., supra note 7, at 1810 (suggesting a model for improving the financial 
management of NEAD chains across multiple hospitals). 
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formal by more formal means of monitoring and control.71 Instead, 
the formal expansion of organizational systems often involves 
considerable symbolic elaboration of rules and expectations.72 The 
imagery of gift exchange is a powerful resource for endowing 
cadaveric organ donation with social meaning. This is so even though 
cadaveric donation is a highly mediated and organizationally 
intensive practice, far removed from the ideal-typical structure of 
generalized exchange of values in small-scale societies. In much the 
same way, the imagery of formal contract may come to structure the 
social meaning of participation in NEAD chains without having much 
contract-enforcement capacity behind it. 
A final possibility is that real institutional formalization will 
intensify as NEAD chains become more common, but that this 
formalization will be confined to the realm of agreements between 
organizations. As we have detailed here, neither contract nor 
generalized exchange drives the practice of NEAD at present. 
Rather, the majority of actual exchanges still resemble the simplest 
form of exchange described in Figure 1: direct, simultaneous 
exchange between parties with no time delay or opportunity to back 
out. Even in the widely reported sixty-person (thirty-donor) chain,73 
only five links involved a pay-it-forward delay of more than twenty-
four hours. Strikingly, when considered as exchanges between 
transplant centers rather than individual patient-donor pairs, each of 
these five longer-term links—which were of thirteen, twenty-one, 
four, sixty-eight, and twelve days in length, respectively—was itself a 
directly reciprocated exchange, in which the chain was moved 
forward when the receiving transplant center gave a kidney back to 
the center from which it had received a kidney. From this perspective, 
what appears to the public and to participants as an instance of 
solidaristic, chain-generalized exchange is, from the point of view of 
transplant centers, better seen as a restricted exchange of kidneys 
 
 71. See Robert E. Scott, The Promise and the Peril of Relational Contract Theory 9–10 (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal) (reviewing the literature on formal and informal enforcement 
mechanisms in contract and arguing that economic-relationalist research largely assumes “that 
the relationship between formal contract and informal norms [i]s antagonistic: the introduction 
of formal contract and its ‘high-powered’ sanctions tended to crowd out the otherwise powerful 
informal forces” of contract enforcement (footnote omitted)).  
 72. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 357 (1977).  
 73. Sack, supra note 27. 
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under strong and perhaps formally specified expectations for 
reciprocation. 
CONCLUSION 
Our focus in this Essay has been on the “goodness of fit” 
between the practical organization of NEAD chains and the social 
imaginaries of customary gift exchange and formal contract-based 
transactions. Our approach has been to treat this fit as variable, and 
the different levels of the exchange process as separable. We have 
argued against a tendency in the literature to fuse questions of 
individual motivation, social interaction, and institutional 
organization into a unified characterization of “gift” versus 
“contractual” exchange in goods like human organs. Instead, we have 
argued, the social imaginaries of gift- and contract-based exchange 
provide rich cultural resources to participants and professionals 
seeking to frame the social meaning of NEAD chains. This effort 
takes place against a background of largely fixed logistical demands 
and organizational actors. Both gift and contract have the potential to 
act as schemas for the exchange. Neither fit perfectly. Gift exchange is 
the more familiar template in this kind of case, but we have argued 
that contract also has the potential to symbolically frame the 
exchange. Despite being rejected as inappropriate by some 
organizational actors, contract-like forms appear implicitly or 
explicitly at several points in the NEAD donation-and-exchange 
process—not, we emphasize, because anyone expects to legally 
enforce them, but rather, it seems, for their ability to powerfully 
symbolize credible commitments by participants. Whether this 
symbolic use of contract will continue to expand is an empirical 
question. Meanwhile, NEAD chains should also be seen as systems of 
exchange among organizations, not just individual donors. Because 
these organizations deal with kidney exchanges repeatedly and as a 
matter of course, we may see more formalization of standards and 
expectations for reciprocation among participating entities—perhaps 
driven in part by a desire to ensure that the different parts of the 
organizational layer, too, are giving and receiving their fair share. 
 
